Compared to other ERP, BPCS is not structured to make it easy to figure out 
who updated what ... BPCS is embezzler-friendly, under a theory of security 
by obscurity, so people who can figure out the loopholes have a great 
advantage over people who learn only the BPCS how it works standards.
I know of many of those holes, and embezzlement-friendly features, would 
never spell them out in a public forum like this, only in briefings to my 
own management and our auditors. Unfortunately I am always kept too busy 
with day to day needs to take  advantage of optimal strategic protections 
from the risks.
Depending on version of BPCS, there are all kinds of histories & 
cross-indexing where data in various files can be tracked back to what 
records in other files have more information about the activity.
The quality of this is much like IBM Security Auditing, which is easy to 
turn on, but you have to have like a Masters Degree in Security from a 
thousand hours of IBM classes to figure out what the security log is 
telling you, or buy some 3rd party package to interpret the logs for you.
For example, there is inventory history which includes name of user signed 
on at what work station who entered the transactions, a system which is 
only as good as internal company policies with regards to different people 
having their own sign-ons, which can be constrained by the # of users 
license for BPCS.
The General Ledger and other applications have a ton of reference fields 
which generally do not appear in any standard BPCS reports & inquiries, 
which can be used for forensic back tracing analysis, capabilities not 
detailed in any documentation delivered to BPCS customers.  General Ledger 
has business rules which permit different levels of detail tracking 
different kinds of transactions.  So those transactions where there's 
little management interest in GL back tracking, or we have alternative ways 
to track, let's not clog up the disk space with detail logging, while in 
other areas where we have doubts about the veracity of BPCS integrity, 
let's get all the auditable detail we can.
There are also add-ons from 3rd parties that make deciphering the evidence 
something that can be done by non-technical management and accounting 
auditors without any hassles.  What you are describing is an add-on from 
UPI where management identifies activities they want to track, like changes 
to costs, pricing, engineering, supply chain business rules, whatever, 
which determines what gets logged into disk space, in which it does not 
matter if the update is done by BPCS software, some IBM utility like DFU, 
open source for 400, an authorized user, a hacker ... it tracks who did 
what when how for later review.
A later version of the software, not yet released, promises to have 
business rules to block certain kinds of unauthorized activity, instead of 
the current version where it logs the embezzlement, sabotage, human error 
etc. for someone later to see when they review the log.
Al Macintyre
20 year veteran of messing with BPCS
40 year veteran of working on IBM midrange
Does BPCS have an Event log?
By this I mean something in the form of:
Id     activity name    timestamp     user id
for each batch and user transactions.
The Id would be a unique identifier used to trace an instance of an 
process from beginning to end
The activity name may be a program name (with different phases - start 
cancel end etc).
Any help would be appreciated.
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