RE: iSeries FTP security

["Ingvaldson, Scott" <SIngvaldson@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I'll certainly agree that many, if not most, shops do not pay enough
attention to security.  What I disagree with is that this particular
"exploit" is as serious as is implied, based on the requirement of a
valid, authenticated user to perform it.  That's like saying that
leaving your QSECOFR password set to default and having a direct
internet connection is a "serious vulnerability."  

Mr. Carmel, who's bio states the he wrote his first BASIC program in
1978 and received his first offer to commit a cyber crime in 1994 (but
apparently hasn't done much since then,) seems merely to be trying to
sell his $39 Ebook by exploiting  misunderstanding of iSeries security.
He admitted here last month
http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l/200504/msg01339.html that he does
"not even have an iSeries server."  Most of the "exploits" he exposes
follow this same vein, for instance one that exposes weaknesses in
"terminal emulation clients," again by "valid, authenticated users."
Mr. Carmel's only valid argument seems to be that some services should
not be turned on by default.

I suspect that in most of our shops that any "valid, authenticated user"
can log onto the system any way they see fit and get access to any "of
the files that he has authority to access, based on the server assigned
object authority."  Is this really an exploit?

Certainly, Rob, a sufficiently knowledgeable and talented user could use
FTP to go after
/qsys.lib/mylib.lib/myfile.file/mymbr.mbr/../../payroll.file/payroll.mbr
and download the payroll file, but should this user have FTP access to
this system at all?  Is this really an "exploit" or, to coin a phrase
"Working As Designed?"  How difficult is it to write an Exit Point
Program to restrict all FTP access to authorized FTP users only?  

Regards,
 
Scott Ingvaldson
iSeries System Administrator
GuideOne Insurance Group

-----Original Message-----
date: Mon, 16 May 2005 14:28:04 -0500
from: rob@xxxxxxxxx
subject: RE: iSeries FTP security

Scott,

I respectfully disagree.

A bulk of 400 shops do not granualize their security enough.  For
example, 
they use some sort of group profile to allow users to get into the 
'accounting' data library.  Once in there they hope that 5250 menu 
security works.  Now comes along a ftp project request.

One alternative might have been to change all their 5250 programs to 
USEADPAUT(*YES) and have some early program owned in the call stack to
be 
owned appropriately and then also allow read access to individual users
of 
the one file to download.

Another alternative is to leave the bulk of the security model the same,

but use an ftp exit point program to only allow from one member in one 
file:
/qsys.lib/mylib.lib/myfile.file/mymbr.mbr

But by canonization you could do
/qsys.lib/mylib.lib/myfile.file/mymbr.mbr/../../payroll.file/payroll.mbr
and get to what you need.  Because, if the exit point followed my poor 
technique of just checking the left to match with what they are
authorized 
to - they're toast.

Rob Berendt
-- 
Group Dekko Services, LLC