RE: User profile question -- MIDRANGE-L

> For Rob's sign-on scenario, why not modify the sign-on
> screen to hide or
> protect the menu and program fields?  That is not a hard
> change, and it
> takes this security risk away.
> 
> Everywhere I have worked, the sign-on screen has been
> modified so that the
> user is only allowed to enter their ID and password.  It's
> less confusing
> for the users and gives better control over the sign-on so
> they don't get
> into something where they don't belong.

Modifying the signon screen is a great idea for a number of reasons -
but taking away the security risk is not one of them.

If you would like to prove this to yourself, create a very un-powerful
user "BUBBA" like so:

CRTUSRPRF USRPRF(BUBBA) PASSWORD() USRCLS(*USER) INLMNU(*SIGNOFF)
LMTCPB(*YES) TEXT('Test-can be deleted any day after creation date')
SPCAUT(*NONE)

Then FTP into your iSeries with BUBBA's ID.  You can expect to get
logged in successfully.

If you want to read data, do these ftp commands...

> cd /qgpl
> get qgpl/qddssrc.qdsignon c:\qdsignon.txt

...and you'll have a copy of the Signon Screeds DDS source on your C:
drive

If you were to do the same thing against one of your own production
files, just cd/yourlib - but don't try anything destructive like a
delete - it would very likely be successful.

A little roaming around here should convince you that INLPGM and INLMNU
(whether on the profile or on the signon screen) do not provide security
- they are merely a convenient way for you to customize the experience
of the user.

jte
 


--
John Earl | Chief Technology Officer
The PowerTech Group
19426 68th Ave. S
Seattle, WA 98032
(253) 872-7788 ext. 302
john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
www.powertech.com 
 

 
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--

> -----Original Message-----
> From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:midrange-l-
> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ron-
> Zimmerman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2006 8:11 AM
> To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
> Subject: RE: User profile question
> 
> For Rob's sign-on scenario, why not modify the sign-on
> screen to hide or
> protect the menu and program fields?  That is not a hard
> change, and it
> takes this security risk away.
> 
> Everywhere I have worked, the sign-on screen has been
> modified so that the
> user is only allowed to enter their ID and password.  It's
> less confusing
> for the users and gives better control over the sign-on so
> they don't get
> into something where they don't belong.
> 
> Thank you,
> Ronald L. Zimmerman
> I.T. Applications Manager
> Swiss Valley Farms, Co.      http://www.swissvalley.com
> "The Good for You Company"
> Email: Ron-Zimmerman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> 
> midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote on 01/26/2006
> 09:31:00 AM:
> 
> > Rob,
> >
> > I am not arguing the point about non-limited capability
> users and the
> > signon screen.  I agree that a user who is LMTCPB(*NO)
> can modify the
> > default menu/program/library entries on the signon
> screen and bypass
> > your initial program security.
> >
> > The point I was trying to make is that even users who
> are LMTCPB(*YES)
> > or (*PARTIAL) can have very broad access to the system
> by signing on
> > through other methods such as ftp.  Even if you specify
> that user BUBBA
> > has either a nonexistent initial program, or an
> INLPGM(*NONE) and
> > INLMNU(*SIGNOFF), BUBBA can still log onto the system
> through any of the
> > other connection points that do not use the 5250
> interactive signon
> > subsystem (ftp being the easiest one to test).
> >
> > Another way to look at it (and I bet we can agree on
> this) is that the
> > INLPGM and INLMNU parameters on a user profile are
> convenience tools -
> > they help you customize the environment for the user -
> they are not
> > security tools because you cannot guaranty that a user
> with a valid
> > profile and password will invoke these parameters at
> every logon.
> >
> > jte
> >
> >
> > --
> > John Earl | Chief Technology Officer
> > The PowerTech Group
> > 19426 68th Ave. S
> > Seattle, WA 98032
> > (253) 872-7788 ext. 302
> > john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > www.powertech.com
> >
> >
> >
> > This email message and any attachments are intended only
> for the use of
> > the intended recipients and may contain information that
> is privileged
> > and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient,
> any
> > dissemination, distribution, or copying is strictly
> prohibited. If you
> > received this email message in error, please immediately
> notify the
> > sender by replying to this email message, or by
> telephone, and delete
> > the message from your email system.
> > --
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:midrange-l-
> > > bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of rob@xxxxxxxxx
> > > Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2006 5:14 AM
> > > To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
> > > Subject: RE: User profile question
> > >
> > > As I demonstrated earlier, INLPGM(...) will NOT
> prevent a
> > > user from
> > > signing on to a 5250 session.  They can always
> override
> > > the initial
> > > program on the sign in screen.  Typing in *NONE, or
> QCMD,
> > > are a couple of
> > > quick samples for the
> > > Program/procedure . . .    prompt
> > >
> > > Of course, now that I keep repeating this it's
> probably on
> > > Shalom's list
> > > or something so that kills using it and relying on
> > > "security by
> > > obscurity".
> > >
> > > Again, I can do this
> > > CRTUSRPRF USRPRF(DELETEME) PASSWORD() INLPGM(BUBBA)
> > > INLMNU(*SIGNOFF)
> > > and sign on using
> > > User  . . . . . . . . DELETEME
> > > Password  . . . . . .
> > > Program/procedure . . QCMD
> > > Menu  . . . . . . . . MAIN
> > > Current library . . .
> > > and get right in to a command line.
> > >
> > > However, if I also add LMTCPB(*YES), then any attempts
> to
> > > change the
> > > program, or menu, on the initial signon result in
> > > CPF1121 Initial program or procedure cannot be
> specified.
> > > CPF1122 Menu cannot be specified.
> > >
> > > Rob Berendt
> > > --
> > > Group Dekko Services, LLC
> > > Dept 01.073
> > > PO Box 2000
> > > Dock 108
> > > 6928N 400E
> > > Kendallville, IN 46755
> > > http://www.dekko.com
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > "John Earl" <john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Sent by: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > 01/25/2006 07:11 PM
> > > Please respond to
> > > Midrange Systems Technical Discussion <midrange-
> > > l@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > >
> > > To
> > > "Midrange Systems Technical Discussion" <midrange-
> > > l@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > cc
> > >
> > > Fax to
> > >
> > > Subject
> > > RE: User profile question
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Jim,
> > >
> > > > CHGUSRPRF USRPRF(userid) PWDEXP(*NO)
> > > INLPGM(*LIBL/XXXXXXX)
> > > > <---- the
> > > > XXXXXXX will not allow the user to sign on, but is
> > > should
> > > > allow jobs,
> > > > that need the Userid to be *Enabled, to run.
> > >
> > >
> > > The INLPGM(*LIBL/XXXXXXX) will prevent a user from
> signing
> > > on to a 5250
> > > (telnet) session, but it will not inhibit signon from
> ftp,
> > > ODBC, OPSNAV,
> > > etc. etc. etc.  I'm pretty sure the INLPGM parameter
> is
> > > only used for
> > > 5250 signon.
> > >
> > > jte
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > John Earl | Chief Technology Officer
> > > The PowerTech Group
> > > 19426 68th Ave. S
> > > Seattle, WA 98032
> > > (253) 872-7788 ext. 302
> > > john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > www.powertech.com
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This email message and any attachments are intended
> only
> > > for the use of
> > > the intended recipients and may contain information
> that
> > > is privileged
> > > and confidential. If you are not the intended
> recipient,
> > > any
> > > dissemination, distribution, or copying is strictly
> > > prohibited. If you
> > > received this email message in error, please
> immediately
> > > notify the
> > > sender by replying to this email message, or by
> telephone,
> > > and delete
> > > the message from your email system.
> > > --
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
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