Re: Guess they didn't use an iSeries... Windows for a voting solution? Puleeeeze!

[Booth Martin <booth@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I still am fascinated by the indelible ink on the thumb that other 
countries use.

Raul A. Jager W. wrote:
> The simpler the voting machine, the easier to audit it.  But, it still 
> requires a "guru".  The best is to print a piece of paper that the voter 
> can read, see that it has only the name of his candidate, and drop in an 
> urn.
> Count manualy to validate the results.
> ___________________________________________________________________________________________
> Peter Dow (ML) wrote:
>
> > But if verification is passed back through the voting machine, what's to 
> > prevent it from changing it?  I vote for Bulbous Frumpwort, it gets sent 
> > to the iSeries as Jamus Plugly, the iSeries sends back that I voted for 
> > Jamus Plugly, and the voting machine shows me I voted for Bulbous 
> > Frumpwort.  How did having an iSeries in the loop help?
> >
> > *Peter Dow* /
> > Dow Software Services, Inc.
> > 909 793-9050
> > pdow@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:pdow@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> /
> >
> > Larry Bolhuis wrote:
> >  
> >
> > > Some time back some friends and I were talking about how the heck you 
> > > could possibly trust winDOHs anything to actually count votes in such a 
> > > way that Reliably is insured and Fraud is impossible. We decided (rather 
> > > quickly) that you just couldn't. With i5/OS however it seems to me that 
> > > the answer is so simple that it's elegant. Use any freekin front end 
> > > that you want to do the voting, web browser, 5250 screen, windows 
> > > program with ODBC, whatever, don't care. In any case when the vote hits 
> > > the database (which will *ABSOLUTELY be journaled) you scrape the 
> > > journal. The Journal contains everything the voter did and you use that 
> > > transaction to spit out the voters ticket, NOT the voting machine. In 
> > > other words what the voter gets out of the voting machine is not simply 
> > > a reflection of what they put into the machine, rather it's downstream 
> > > of the actual votes that were posted. If the voter then verifies the 
> > > ballot in their hand is correct, shazamm no fraud, and you vote is 
> > > already in the DB. If required a list of votes could also be printed at 
> > > the precinct as the tickets come out but hey, it's in the journal so 
> > > it's in the DB. Done deal.
> > >
> > > Another example of the System i, and i5/OS being an integrated solution, 
> > > and kicking the **** out of M$.
> > >
> > > - Larry
> > >
> > > Joe Pluta wrote:
> > >  
> > >    
> > >
> > > > Cook County is embroiled in controversy yet again, although this time it's
> > > > the machines not The Machine.  Nearly a week after elections, votes are
> > > > still being counted - votes that were supposed to be counted automatically
> > > > by the Sequoia Voting Systems electronic balloting machines.  And while
> > > > Sequoia insists that their systems are more secure than Diebold's because
> > > > they don't use Windows, as it turns out this is only the voting machine
> > > > itself.  The back end "WinEDS" system (which does the tallying and
> > > > reporting) uses Microsoft SQL Server as its database, and evidently it has a
> > > > problem counting a million or so votes.
> > > >
> > > > DB2/400 posts a million transactions in seconds (or maybe minutes, but
> > > > certainly not days!).
> > > >
> > > > I'm being a bit facetious here.  From what I could see, voters vote on a
> > > > touch screen, then the touch screen results are printed out on special
> > > > forms, which are then fed into a reader.  It's the reader that seems to be
> > > > the bottleneck.  But I'm just guessing.
> > > >
> > > > Joe
> > > >    
> > > >      
> >