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This has been an intriguing discussion thread. In my view, a "moving employee" generates two categories of system access concerns: Risk A and Risk B ----> A. Risk that the transferred employee is disabled in the new role until the proper system authorities are granted. This is not so serious because it should come to QSECOFR attention all by itself when the employee's new supervisor complains about an impossible tangle of system access hang-ups. B. Risk that authority to objects used in the prior job is not promptly terminated. Presuming that the new supervisor complains that his/her new employee can't do anything productive in his/her new job, then the urgent demand to fix Risk A should be all the alert QSECOFR would need to trigger the Risk B fix. Now ..... if the "should work all by itself" fix to Risk A does NOT happen all by itself, the implication is that something about the individual's authorities in the prior position were too broad ..... and/or ........ something about the overall security of OS/400 requires a very sophisticated analysis. Here's a very instructive presentation of OS/400 vulnerabilities ranked in order of how many understandable English words are needed to explain them: http://www.unbeatenpathintl.com/BOH-Benefits/source/1.html Here's an idea for an affordable "fine-tooth-comb" analysis of every conceivable OS/400 security vulnerability: Bill of Health (R) http://www.upisox.com/bill.html The product provides robust information about every discovered risk and detailed guidance about how to go about removing each one. Warmest regards, Milt Habeck mhabeck@xxxxxxxxxx North America: (888) 874-8008 International: (262) 681-3151 ________________________________ From: Mike Cunningham To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Friday, March 16, 2007 2:10 PM Subject: RE: User authority controls This sounds like exactly what we are doing, trying to figure out what HR is doing. We give ourselves notice of a title change but right now our network admins don't do anything with it because they say they don't know what to do. From a title change they can't tell if the person actually changed jobs or not. When you say you "take appropriate action" is that calling someone to find out what happened and then making whatever changes are necessary? p.s. In order to be sure that SSMITH is Sally Smith and not Sam Smithfield, We created a cross reference table that mapped userid to an employee number so we don't have to guess what two go together. We scan all userids weekly and look at the linked HR records and see if the person is still employed just as a double check of the e-mail notifications our HR office sends out. We also do the opposite and scan HR files and look for active employees who don't have accounts (in our standards all employees get an account) and report those as problems also. Sometimes (rarely but it happens) the HR notification of a new hire does not come out until after someone has been at work for a week or more. We are also scanning Active Directory LDAP accounts to match them up to iSeries userids (standard is both userids will be the same) and HR files and tell our network admins what accounts they should disable/delete. ________________________________ From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Roger Harman Sent: Fri 3/16/2007 2:14 PM To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: Re: User authority controls When I started here, they used the concept of naming a user profile by the job type. I converted to using names a few years ago and everyone has loved it. Besides matching the network & email naming, it just makes life easier. Can you remember who RMBY11 (Retail Merchandise Buyer #11) is? I can't, but I can easily know who SSMITH is. As to job changes.... we run a SQL report over the HR transaction database nightly. We look for job code changes and cost center changes and match the name to user profiles. If we get a hit, we take appropriate action. The job change may have no effect on their access or we may disable the profile if they've moved, say, from Merchandise to Foods - particularly important for Time & Attendance access. BTW... we also run a daily termination list and match it to user profiles (iSeries and network) and disable those. We review both manually since there is a good possibility of false positives - SSMITH user profile may be Sally Smith but it was Sam Smith who left the company. I hope to improve the process by adding a notation for computer access to the HR record to eliminate the false positives - track it like we do special licenses, company issued property, etc. ________________________________
mcunning@xxxxxxx 03/16/2007 8:30:15 AM >>>
We have a good handle on authority setup for new employees and on removing authority for employees who are leaving. What we struggle with are those employees who change jobs within the college. Sometimes those are people leaving one department and going to another, sometimes those are people just getting a title change. Our HR office is very good at telling us who new hires are and who is leaving but not so good at jobs changers. I am curious to know how you handle these people from an authority control perspective. One idea we had was to look for any title changes and treat them as if they left the college and are coming back in as a new employee. Disable their account and revoke all authority then grant just the base level of authority to the new job until we hear from that persons new supervisor. Of course this then requires going into all the systems where mcunning has an account and disabling it. Another thought was to stop creating accounts based on someone's name but use their position instead. So my userid would not be MCUNNING but ITSDIR. ITSDIR is granted authority not MCUNNING. When MCUNNING changes jobs the ITSDIR account would be disabled and my new job account would be enabled. When the new ITSDIR comes on board we reactivate that account. We use to use this method a long time ago but our users revolted because it is sometimes very hard to turn a title into 10 characters and have it make sense. Try coming up with 10 characters for Director or Desktop Computing/Academic Computing/Media Services.
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