Something else known to guy(s) who do everything.  When no 
one is in the building, there is a burglar alarm system ... 
different people have been issued id-codes which they change 
even less often than passwords.  Guess how many people have 
told their id-codes to co-workers who have not yet been 
issued their own id-codes?
If we are going to be changing physical locks and passwords, 
perhaps also change burglar alarm codes.
Some computer technicians claim they need to know everyone 
passwords, so that if anything goes wrong they can get into 
anyone systems.  Same kind of arguement is used with company 
burglar alarm system.
Here's another HIT BY BUS story, that could be a learning 
experience.  Lessons in this story include:
* Security is only as good as the weakest link, of which 
there can be several ... e.g. there is a lock on gate to 
factory, which hangs loose during the day ... a crook could 
substitute crook's lock, then after place locked up, drive up 
unlock crook's lock, fill up vehicle, put back on company 
lock.
* Security by obscurity is not good enough
* Former employees know where things are kept
* False ceilings mean locked doors can be circumvented
* Long time employees are aware of multiple security holes, 
never fixed because never in any budget
* Do you use checks that are pre-signed & if any of them went 
missing, how soon would you realize they went missing?
* It is not enough to say a former employee is not coming 
back, there also ought to be instructions what to do if they 
do come back.
I work late almost every nite after rest of office crew gone 
home.  A senior engineering manager had heart attack.  I was 
told he wasn't coming back, that it had triggered early 
retirement.  One nite he shows up looking for "his stuff."  I 
tell him he's looking great! (He really looked like death's 
doorstep.)
I tell him they reassigned his office & I have no idea 
where "his stuff" went. (true)  He tells me they told him it 
is in the vault.  (This is a small locked windowless office 
where we store our master set of keys, confidential papers, 
accounting records, checks that have someone signature pre-
printed, etc. ... say, if some of them went missing, how soon 
would we figure that out?)
I tell him I no longer have key to vault (true) so I can't 
get in there (false, it has false ceiling that can be climbed 
over, but it has been years since I have been sufficiently 
energized to use that kind of "top door" (I have not done so 
since I spent several hours one weekend stuck in a roof crawl 
space)).
He says he can get in.
I follow him, curious.
He goes to accounting lady desk, opens a drawer, looks at 
tags attached to keys, takes one key & unlocks a file 
drawer.  In back of the week's paychecks, that get 
distributed at end of week, is a lock box, which he opens 
with another key from accounting lady desk, and takes out the 
key to the vault, which he then opens, so he can 
retrieve "his stuff."  I carry it out for him, to his vehicle 
being driven by his wife.  (He really is physically much less 
than the man I remembered as a co-worker.)
Next day I ask accounting lady if these arrangements get 
changed after departure of high-profile people, and if having 
her desk unlocked makes sense to her.  She says she's been 
asking for a desk that's lockable for over 10 years, and 
perpetually been told there's no budget for it.  
Since this happened, she has been issued a lockable desk, but 
it looks kind of flimsy to me.
---- Original message ----
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2007 14:54:39 -0700 (PDT)
From: Steve Martinson <smartfamily2003@xxxxxxxxx>  
Subject: Re: Preparing for a High-profile Termination  
To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Booth & Tom:
I agree that someone in a position of power would also 
likely know passwords for a whole bunch of profiles, 
especially in the smaller shops where the poor guy runs the 
whole show (we consult mostly to community banks that are in 
that mode).  Reviewing the profile object "created by" 
attribute is already on my list.
Validation lists are important too!  Thanks.
Best regards,
Steven W. Martinson, CISSP, CISM
Sheshunoff Management Services, LP.
Senior Consultant - Technology & Risk Management
2801 Via Fortuna, Suite 600 | Austin, TX 78746
Direct: 281.758.2429 | Mobile: 512.779.2630
e.Mail: smartinson@xxxxxxxxx
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