RE: RMTCMD's security?

So Paul,

Does that make you one of the criminals when someone jumps from your server to another and wrecks havoc there? :)

For those that believe only protecting your system from intruders all I can say is good luck when someone uses QCMDEXC as an SQL procedure and that procedure does something like this to cover their tracks...

Connect to remote system using SQL
Use SQL to call QCMDEXC which contains SBMRMTCMD back to your originating system.
The SBMRMTCMD to run is... CLRLIB LIB(QSYS)

We tend to forget where the majority of intrusions originate.

The long and the short of it is protect the front door, the windows and the back door.

Gary Monnier


-----Original Message-----
From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Paul Therrien
Sent: Friday, May 18, 2012 6:18 AM
To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
Subject: RE: RMTCMD's security?

I like that analogy ... breaking the legs of every conceivable criminal :)

Paul Therrien
Orion South, Inc.
504-374-9551
800-437-7173
ptherrien@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

-----Original Message-----
From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Scott Klement
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2012 5:25 PM
To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
Subject: Re: RMTCMD's security?

Hi Gary,

I certainly did not say that securing what can be executed on a system is silly!

Securing SBMRMTCMD won't stop a worm from going here or there -- THAT is my point.

If there were only two systems in the world, and SBMRMTCMD was the only possible conceivable command to submit a command, then your philosophy
might work... but unfortunately, that isn't reality.

An analogy:

Securing the server against running remote commands (which is what I
advocate) is like putting your money in a safe so a robber can't break into your house and steal it.

Securing the server by disabling the client command (which is what you seem to be advocating) is like going to every conceivable criminal's house and breaking their legs so they can't travel to your house to steal your money.


On 5/17/2012 4:59 PM, Monnier, Gary wrote:

Hi Scott,

I'm surprised you feel securing what can be executed on a system as silly. Not doing so, from my knothole onto the world, seems absurd. To me, it is akin to buying a padlock for a locker but not actually locking it!!

If you can't get from system A to System B because the stuff allowing it is unavailable to you who cares how tightly system B is locked down? System A isn't letting you get there anyway.

A worm goes here
A worm goes there
Until it is stopped from going anywhere.
It is stopped when it cannot execute stuff allowing it go somewhere.

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