RE: IIS to as/400 odbc

["Joe Pluta" <joepluta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

As the script kiddies get more sophisticated, Leif, I think you need both
strong network policy procedures and proprietary protocols.  I don't pretend
to be able to secure a system against a targeted, malicious attack.  I'm
just trying to keep people from inadvertantly opening their systems to the
world.

As Jeffrey Silberberg pointed out, the only REALLY secure system is one that
isn't running.  Other than that, you CANNOT secure a system.  That's because
there's one route into a supposedly secure network that will always work:
compromise a trusted employee.  No security system in the world can guard
against that.

On the other hand, you can guard against script kiddies and other forms of
random e-violence (e-vandalism?), and that's what I try to tell people.
It's a classic trade-off: protection against random attacks vs. extra
programming effort.  Sort of like taking out fire insurance on your house.
You probably will never need it, but most banks won't give you a mortgage if
you don't.  I think the same should be true of protection against
non-targeted security breaches.

Joe


> -----Original Message-----
> From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com
> [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Leif Svalgaard
> Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 9:09 AM
> To: midrange-l@midrange.com
> Subject: Re: IIS to as/400 odbc
>
>
> From: Joe Pluta <joepluta@PlutaBrothers.com>
>
> > I personally prefer to use a message-based design
> > where I have designed the protocol and nobody on the
> > outside is likely to be able to hack it
>
> Joe,
> I generally agree with you that being in control of the
> interface is a good thing, but I would disagree with
> your "security by obscurity" argument. True, if you
> use a proprietary protocol, that the 'script kiddies'
> are left out in the cold, but if your system is worthy
> of attack, the bad guys will get you anyway.