Re: Fix Security (was: Paging file)

["Leif Svalgaard" <leif@xxxxxxxx>]

From: <vhamberg@attbi.com>>
> So where's the advantage suggested by your remark? To
> make "bad" changes on the 400, you still have to have
> got there with sufficient authority in the first place.
> And you also need to do that in *nix systems. But once
> in the system, you're "god", or at least halfway there.
>
> But is there any way for someone without *ALLOBJ (and
> probably a few other rights) to do this tampering on a
> virgin 400? When there's been no program written to put
> the job into privileged status? Not if your authority is
> not high enough, I don't think.

You guys just won't see it. On AS/400 number one (yours)
you have all the authority you need. You make a program
(normal user state, no adoption of authority) and patch it
to make it malware. Then recalculate the program validation
value and save the program. Transfer the save file to
another AS/400 (the one you are attacking) and restore
the malware program. For this you need only enough
authority to restore the program. You might charm the
system operator or the user to restore it for you. Maybe
it is a demo program that also does something useful
and interesting. Once the program is restored (as it
will with no problems as it is just a user state program;
you can even sign it for that matter) you run it and now
you are God on the other AS/400.